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I. INTRODUCTION
On the final day of the last Term, the Supreme Court issued its
much-anticipated decision in J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro.1
The case ended two decades of high court abstinence from the topic of
personal jurisdiction.' Even more frustrating than the length of that
hiatus was the fact that, during that period, the Court's most up-to-
date pronouncements on the topic were two inconclusive decisions
that had failed to generate a majority opinion on important aspects of
jurisdictional doctrine: Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court3
and Burnham v. Superior Court.4
* Professor of Law & Michael J. Zimmer Fellow, Seton Hall University School of Law.
This essay benefitted greatly from the comments and insights of my co-panelists at this sympo-
sium-Trey Childress, Allan Ides, and Linda Silberman. I am also grateful to Jenny Carroll,
Robin Effron, Ed Harnett, Denis McLaughlin, Arthur Miller, Charles Sullivan, and John Vail,
whose thoughts about the McIntyre case have been very helpful to me in preparing this essay.
Finally, thanks to the editors of the Southwestern Journal of International Law, both for organiz-
ing a terrific symposium and for their excellent editorial work on this essay.
1. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
2. Also helping to end the personal-jurisdiction drought was a less divisive decision issued
that same day. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011)
(Ginsburg, J.) (unanimous opinion).
3. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
4. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
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When certiorari was granted,5 McIntyre seemed like a potential
vehicle for resolving the post-Asahi uncertainty about how to assess
whether jurisdiction is proper over a defendant whose products reach
a state through the so-called "stream of commerce."6 The plaintiff in
McIntyre was Robert Nicastro, who suffered serious injuries to his
hand while operating a metal-shearing machine at Curcio Scrap
Metal, the New Jersey company where he worked. Mr. Nicastro filed
a lawsuit in New Jersey state court against J. McIntyre Machinery, the
British corporation that had manufactured the shearing machine.
Curcio had purchased the machine from an Ohio-based company
(McIntyre Machinery of America) that had agreed to sell J. McIn-
tyre's machines in the United States. During the course of this distri-
bution agreement-including the period when Curcio purchased the
machine involved in the accident-J. McIntyre regularly sent its offi-
cials from the United Kingdom to industry trade shows throughout
the United States (although never in New Jersey). The machine that
injured Mr. Nicastro may have been the only J. McIntyre machine to
have been purchased by a New Jersey customer.7
The New Jersey trial court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdic-
tion, but the New Jersey Court of Appeals and the New Jersey Su-
preme Court concluded that jurisdiction was proper.8 A majority of
Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that Mr. Nicas-
tro had not met his burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over
the British manufacturer in New Jersey. The Justices split four-to-
two-to-three, however. Justice Kennedy wrote a plurality opinion re-
jecting jurisdiction on behalf of himself, Chief Justice Roberts, and
Justices Scalia and Thomas.9 Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissenting
5. See McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. 62 (2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
6. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105 ("This case presents the question whether the mere aware-
ness on the part of a foreign defendant that the components it manufactured, sold, and delivered
outside the United States would reach the forum State in the stream of commerce constitutes
minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum State such that the exercise of jurisdic-
tion does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." (citations and inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).
7. As described infra notes 127-135 and accompanying text, the Justices' descriptions of
the relevant facts in McIntyre differ in some significant respects, and there is disagreement about
what information should have been considered in assessing whether jurisdiction was proper. For
each Justices' factual narrative, see McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2786, 2790 (Kennedy, J., plurality); id.
at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 2795-97 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). For a more detailed
account of the McIntyre record and the differences among the Justices about that record, see
Adam N. Steinman, The Lay of the Land: Examining the Three Opinions in J. McIntyre Machin-
ery v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV. 481, 488-91 (2012).
8. See Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575 (N.J. 2010), affd, 945 A.2d 92,
104 (N.J. App. 2008).
9. See McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2785 (Kennedy, J., plurality).
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opinion (that would have upheld jurisdiction) on behalf of herself and
Justices Sotomayor and Kagan.' ° Justices Breyer and Alito broke the
impasse by providing two more votes against jurisdiction, but their
concurring opinion (written by Justice Breyer) explicitly rejected sig-
nificant aspects of Justice Kennedy's reasoning.11
For many, then, McIntyre was not worth the wait. Those hoping
for "greater clarity"12 or for answers to "decades-old questions"13
woke up to yet another inconclusive decision on personal jurisdiction
with no majority opinion. What-if anything-does a fractured deci-
sion like McIntyre mean for current jurisdictional doctrine? In one
sense, to paraphrase Holmes, McIntyre means what courts say it
means. 4 We are already beginning to develop a record on this front;
federal and state courts have cited McIntyre frequently in the eight
months since it was issued. 15 For judges, commentators, and practi-
tioners alike, it is worth exploring how McIntyre is being used and
interpreted by lower courts.
This descriptive task, however, cannot be the entire story. McIn-
tyre is a Supreme Court decision, to which lower courts must look to
ascertain "what the law is." 16 The lack of a majority opinion makes
this a more complicated endeavor, of course. But that fact makes it
especially important to look closely at what the McIntyre opinions
say-and don't say. If lower courts are misreading McIntyre, it is cru-
cial to identify those mistakes at an early stage, lest they find their way
into opinions by federal courts of appeals or state supreme courts, and
take root as binding precedent for some significant subset of our na-
tion's judiciary. 7
This Essay proceeds as follows: Part II summarizes how lower
federal courts and state courts have been citing and interpreting Mc-
10. See id. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
11. See id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 2794 ("[Tihough I agree with the plurality
as to the outcome of this case, I concur only in the judgment of that opinion and not its reason-
ing."); see also infra note 126 and accompanying text.
12. Id. at 2786 (Kennedy, J.).
13. Id. at 2785.
14. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460-61
(1897) ("The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are
what I mean by the law.").
15. According to West's Keycite service, there were 97 federal and state court opinions
citing McIntyre. See Westlaw Keycite of McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (performed on Mar. 9, 2012).
16. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
17. A federal district court opinion, by contrast, is not formally binding via stare decisis,
even within its own district. See, e.g., Chavez v. Board of Educ. of Tularosa, 614 F. Supp. 2d
1184, 1231 (D.N.M. 2008) ("[D]istrict court opinions are not, as a matter of law, binding authori-
ties except on the parties ...").
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Intyre. Part III critically examines two issues over which lower courts
have split when reading McIntyre: (1) the role of "foreseeability" to
the permissible scope of personal jurisdiction, and (2) whether McIn-
tyre declared a winner in the disagreement between the Justice
O'Connor and Justice Brennan four-Justice coalitions in Asahi.18 Part
IV confronts the broader question of how courts should make sense of
Justice Breyer's McIntyre concurrence. Understood correctly, McIn-
tyre does not mandate a more restrictive approach to jurisdiction.
II. How LOWER COURTS ARE INTERPRETING MCINTYRE
This Part summarizes some of the ways that state courts and
lower federal courts have been handling the McIntyre decision during
its first eight months on the books. It organizes these courts' treat-
ment of McIntyre into four categories. First are opinions that cite as-
pects of Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion, sometimes for generally-
accepted propositions but other times for more controversial ideas
that appear in the McIntyre plurality opinion alone.' 9 Second are
opinions that have distinguished McIntyre on factual grounds.2" Third
are opinions (to this point, only a single opinion) reading McIntyre as
calling into question the relevance of the "reasonableness" or "fair-
ness" inquiry that is said to constitute the second step in a two-part
jurisdictional framework.2' Fourth are opinions that have examined
the relationship between the three McIntyre opinions, especially the
extent to which Justices Breyer and Alito can be read as providing the
necessary votes to generate a majority view on particular aspects of
jurisdictional doctrine.22
A. Citations to Justice Kennedy's Plurality Opinion
It is perhaps not surprising that Justice Kennedy's opinion would
be cited frequently by lower courts. The opinion appears first on the
pages of the Supreme Court Reporter and garners a plurality of Jus-
18. Compare Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (O'Connor, J., joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Powell and Scalia) (plurality opinion) ("[P]lacement of a product into the stream of
commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum
State."), with id. at 119-20 (Brennan, J., joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun)
("The forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal
jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the
expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State." (citations and quota-
tion marks omitted)).
19. See infra Part II.A.
20. See infra Part II.B.
21. See infra Part II.C.
22. See infra Part II.D.
[Vol. 18
THE MEANING OF MCINTYRE
tices. It has the look of a majority opinion, if not the votes. That
makes it especially important, however, to examine closely how lower
courts are using Justice Kennedy's opinion. Lower courts should not
allow a non-majority opinion like Justice Kennedy's to trump estab-
lished jurisdictional principles.
Many lower court opinions have cited Justice Kennedy's McIn-
tyre plurality for propositions already established by earlier Supreme
Court decisions. One federal appeals court opinion, for example,
quoted the plurality for the basic distinction between specific jurisdic-
tion and general jurisdiction.23 Another quoted it for the proposition
that personal jurisdiction and choice of law are distinct inquiries.24
And many lower courts have cited Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion
for the general notion that an out-of-state defendant must "purpose-
fully avail[ ] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."
2 5
Although often criticized,26 this principle has been a consistent part of
23. Pangaea, Inc. v. Flying Burrito L.L.C., 647 F.3d 741, 746 (8th Cir. 2011) ("Specific juris-
diction may be established where the claim 'arises out of' or 'relates to' a defendant's contacts
with the forum." (quoting McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2787-88 (Kennedy, J.))); see also id. ("Specific
jurisdiction, like general jurisdiction, may be justified when a defendant, through its contacts
with the forum, purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting business in the forum, 'in
a suit arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum.' " (quoting McIntyre,
131 S. Ct. at 2787-88 (Kennedy, J.))).
24. Adelson v. Hananel, 652 F.3d 75, 81 n.2 (1st Cir. 2011) ("Although ... the district court
concluded that the agreement was governed by Israeli law, this conclusion does not affect the
outcome of our jurisdictional analysis because the issue before us is one of personal jurisdiction,
not choice of law." (citing McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2790 (Kennedy, J.))).
25. See e.g., Carreras v. PMG Collins, L.L.C., 660 F.3d 549, 555 (1st Cir. 2011) ("The base-
line rule is that a defendant is subject to jurisdiction only when it 'purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protec-
tions of its laws.' " (quoting McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2787 (Kennedy, J.))); accord Ex parte City
Boy's Tire and Brake, Inc., No. 1100205, 2011 WL 6848480, at * 8 (Ala. Dec. 30, 2011) ("As a
general rule, the exercise of judicial power is not lawful unless the defendant 'purposefully avails
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws.' " (quoting McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2785 (Kennedy, J.))); see also
Starbucks Corp. v. S. Dakota Network L.L.C. ., No. 8:11CV237, 2011 WL 6399550, at * 2 (D.
Neb. Dec. 20, 2011) (same); see also Englert v. Alibaba.com Hong Kong Ltd., 4:11CV1560 RWS,
2012 WL 162495, at * 2 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 19, 2012) ("Due process requires that a plaintiff show that
a non-resident have 'minimum contacts' with the forum state and that the maintenance of the
lawsuit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " (quoting McIn-
tyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2787 (Kennedy, J.))).
26. See Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical
Evaluation, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 1112, 1115 (1981) (arguing that constitutional limits on personal
jurisdiction should not hinge on "prelitigation contacts between the defendant and the forum");
see also, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction:
From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAvIS L. REv. 19, 53 (1990); A. Benjamin
Spencer, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis, 73 U. CHi. L. REV. 617, 621-22 (2006).
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the Court's contemporary jurisprudence, 2 7 even if its application in
particular cases has not always been clear.28
Some lower court opinions have invoked more controversial lan-
guage in Justice Kennedy's opinion-language that is in significant
tension with earlier majority opinions by the Supreme Court.
29  Of
particular concern is Justice Kennedy's emphasis on sovereignty,3 °
submission, 31 and targeting32 in conceptualizing jurisdiction over out-
of-state defendants. With respect to sovereignty, Justice Kennedy
wrote:
[P]ersonal jurisdiction requires a forum-by-forum, or sovereign-by-
sovereign, analysis. The question is whether a defendant has fol-
lowed a course of conduct directed at the society or economy ex-
isting within the jurisdiction of a given sovereign, so that the
sovereign has the power to subject the defendant to judgment con-
cerning that conduct.33
Earlier Supreme Court decisions, however, rejected the notion
that constitutional limits on personal jurisdiction derive from "an in-
27. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) ("[Ilt is essential in
each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws." (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958))); id. ("This 'purposeful availment'
requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of
random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts, or of the unilateral activity of another party or a
third person." (citations omitted)).
28. Compare, e.g., Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (O'Connor, J.) ("[R]espondents have not demon-
strated any action by Asahi to purposefully avail itself of the California market."), with id. at 116
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("I do not agree with... the conclusion that Asahi did not purposely
avail itself of the California market." (citations omitted)).
29. The discussion below does not include lower court opinions that merely state as a de-
scriptive matter the positions Justice Kennedy expresses in McIntyre. See, e.g., Powell v. Profile
Design L.L.C., No. 4:10-CV-2644, 2012 WL 149518, at * 3 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2012) ("In the
plurality opinion, Justice Kennedy explained that a 'defendant's transmission of goods permits
the exercise of jurisdiction only where the defendant can be said to have targeted the forum; as a
general rule, it is not enough that the defendant might have predicted that its goods will reach
the forum State.' " (quoting McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2788 (Kennedy, J.))); see also Prototype
Productions, Inc. v. Reset, Inc., No. 2:11 CV196, 2012 WL 32417, at *2 n.3 (E.D. Va. Jan. 5, 2012)
(noting that "[t]he plurality held that the defendant's transmission of goods permits the exercise
of jurisdiction only where the defendant can be said to have targeted the forum" but recognizing
that "no opinion commanded a majority" (citations, modifications, and internal citations omit-
ted)). This Essay's concern is with lower court opinions that accept these aspects of Justice
Kennedy's opinion as accurate statements of current law. See infra notes 36, 42, & 45 and ac-
companying text.
30. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
32. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
33. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J.) (emphasis added).
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dependent restriction on the sovereign power of the court."34 In
Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, the
Court wrote: "The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and
protects an individual liberty interest. It represents a restriction on
judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of indi-
vidual liberty."35 Nonetheless, some lower federal courts have par-
roted language from Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion endorsing
sovereignty as the driving force behind our constitutional restrictions
on state court jurisdiction.36
Justice Kennedy also wrote that "the principal inquiry" for pur-
poses of personal jurisdiction is "whether the defendant's activities
manifest an intention to submit to the power of a sovereign. '"" But
this focus on "submission to a State's powers '38 reflects an anachro-
nistic view of jurisdiction that the Supreme Court rejected seven de-
cades ago in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.39 Prior to
International Shoe, jurisdiction over defendants who were not present
in the State was often legitimated by the idea that their "consent to
service and suit" could be "implied" from their actions."n Interna-
tional Shoe put to rest this "legal fiction," recognizing instead that a
defendant's "acts were of such a nature as to justify the fiction.""n In
developing the notion of "minimum contacts," International Shoe re-
jected a jurisdictional framework that was based on the defendant's
implied consent or submission to the State's authority. By conceptual-
34. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-
03 n.10 (1982).
35. Id. at 702; see also McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that
Justice Kennedy's emphasis on "sovereign authority" is inconsistent with earlier Supreme Court
decisions (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 & n.20 (1977))); Richard D. Freer, Per-
sonal Jurisdiction in the Twenty-First Century: The Ironic Legacy of Justice Brennan, 63 S.C. L.
REV. 551, 580 (2012) ("The Court rejected this notion in Insurance Corp. of Ireland."); Stein-
man, supra note 7, at 496-97 n.108.
36. See, e.g., Pangaea, 647 F.3d at 745 ("The question is whether a defendant has followed a
course of conduct directed at the society or economy existing within the jurisdiction of a given
sovereign, so that the sovereign has the power to subject the defendant to judgment concerning
that conduct." (quoting McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J.))); accord Henderson v. Laser
Spine Inst., No. 1:11-CV-0015(JAW), 2011 WL 4526067, at * 12 (D. Me. Sept. 28, 2011).
37. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2788 (Kennedy, J.) (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 2787.
39. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
40. Id. at 318.
41. Id. at 318-19 (emphasis added); see also McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting) ("[I]n International Shoe itself, and decisions thereafter, the Court has made plain that
legal fictions, notably 'presence' and 'implied consent,' should be discarded, for they conceal the
actual bases on which jurisdiction rests."); id. at 2799 ("[T]he Court has explained [that] a forum
can exercise jurisdiction when its contacts with the controversy are sufficient; invocation of a
fictitious consent, the Court has repeatedly said, is unnecessary and unhelpful.").
2012]
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izing jurisdiction as a function of the defendant's "submission," Justice
Kennedy seemed to embrace a long-discarded framework.42 Several
lower federal courts have cited this language from Justice Kennedy's
opinion without recognizing that tension.43
Finally, Justice Kennedy wrote that "[t]he defendant's transmis-
sion of goods permits the exercise of jurisdiction only where the de-
fendant can be said to have targeted the forum."' 4 Justice Breyer's
concurring opinion, however, squarely refused to adopt a targeting
standard. 45  Nonetheless, some lower courts have embraced Justice
Kennedy's idea that a manufacturer must target the forum state in
order to be subject to jurisdiction there.46
42. See J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe plurality's notion
that consent is the animating concept draws no support from controlling decisions of this
Court."); id. at 2799 n.5 ("The plurality's notion that jurisdiction over foreign corporations de-
pends upon the defendant's 'submission,' seems scarcely different from the long-discredited fic-
tion of implied consent." (citation omitted)); Steinman, supra note 7, at 497.
43. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Compania Internacional Financiera S.A., No. 11 Civ. 4904(DLC),
2011 WL 3251813, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 29, 2011) (writing that "'the principal inquiry. . .is
whether the defendant's activities manifest an intention to submit to the power of a sovereign"'
(quoting same)); Yentin v. Michaels, Louis & Assocs., Inc., No. 11-0088, 2011 WL 4104675, at *1
n.1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 2011) ("As the Supreme Court recently observed, 'the principal inquiry'
with respect to personal jurisdiction 'is whether the defendant's activities manifest an intention
to submit to the power of a sovereign."' (quoting same); see also Gerber v. Riordan, 649 F.3d
514, 523 (6th Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., dissenting) ("As the Supreme Court recently observed with
respect to specific jurisdiction, 'The principal inquiry in cases of this sort is whether the defen-
dant's activities manifest an intention to submit to the power of a sovereign."' (quoting McIn-
tyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2788); Bluestone Innovations Texas, L.L.C. v. Formosa Epitaxy Inc., No. 2:10-
cv-171-TJW-CE, 2011 WL 4591922, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2011) (noting "a more limited form
of submission to a State's authority for disputes that arise out of or are connected with the
activities within the state" (emphasis added) (quoting Mclntyre,131 S. Ct. at 2787); Harrelson v.
Lee, 798 F. Supp. 2d 310, 315 (D. Mass. 2011) ("A finding of general jurisdiction is appropriate
when "it is proper to infer an intention to benefit from and thus an intention to submit to the
laws of the forum State." (quoting same)); Starbucks Corp. v. S. Dakota Network L.L.C. ., No.
8:11 CV237, 2011 WL 6399550, at *3 (D. Neb. Dec. 20, 2011) ("A person may submit to a state's
authority in a number of ways" (emphasis added) (citing Mclntyre,131 S. Ct. at 2787); Carolina
Power & Light Co. v. 3M Co., Nos. 5:08-CV-460-FL, 5:08-CV-463-FL, 2011 WL 4591077, at *8
(E.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2011) ("[S]ubmission through contact with and activity directed at a sover-
eign may justify specific jurisdiction in a suit arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts
with the forum." (emphasis added) (quoting McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2787-89.
44. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2788 (Kennedy, J.).
45. Id. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("The plurality seems to state strict rules that limit
jurisdiction where a defendant does not intend to submit to the power of a sovereign and cannot
be said to have targeted the forum.... I do not agree with the plurality's seemingly strict no-
jurisdiction rule.").
46. See Dejana v. Marine Tech., Inc., No. 10-CV-4029(JS)(WDW), 2011 WL 4530012, at *5
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2011) ("[Tlhe defendant's transmission of goods permits the exercise of
jurisdiction only where the defendant can be said to have targeted the forum." (quoting McIn-
tyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2788 (Kennedy, J.)); Circuit Connect, Inc. v. Preferred Transport & Distribu-
tion, Inc., No. 10-cv-514-SM, 2011 WL 3678170, at *2 n.2 (D.N.H. Aug. 22, 2011) ("Mecca has
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To be clear, it is not necessarily undesirable to think of jurisdic-
tion in terms of sovereignty, submission, or even targeting. Indeed,
those concepts are not inherently inconsistent with upholding jurisdic-
tion over a foreign manufacturer like J. McIntyre. It might easily be
said, for example, that a manufacturer who targets the U.S. market as
a whole necessarily targets the states that comprise that U.S. market.47
Likewise, to emphasize "the society or economy existing within the
jurisdiction of a given sovereign" does not prevent the conclusion that
a defendant's conduct is "directed at" the forum state when its con-
duct is directed at a territorial entity (such as the entire United States)
that includes the forum state. 8 And one might say that a defendant
"submits to the power of a sovereign"49 when it purposefully seeks to
access a geographic market that includes the territory of that
sovereign.
One frustrating aspect of Justice Kennedy's opinion is that he
failed to explain why his more general principles supported his conclu-
sion that J. McIntyre's conduct did not constitute targeting or other-
wise submitting to the sovereignty of the states within the United
States, such as New Jersey.5° His claim that "personal jurisdiction re-
only shown that ACI, at sometime prior to loading the machine onto the truck for shipment by
others, knew that the machine was headed for New Hampshire. Mecca has not shown that ACI
otherwise 'targeted the forum."' (quoting same)); Kimberly-Clark Worldwide, Inc. v. Fameccan-
ica Data S.p.A No. 10-C-0917, 2011 WL 2634287, at *6 (E.D. Wis. July 5, 2011) ("The Supreme
Court concluded that the 'defendant's transmission of goods permits the exercise of jurisdiction
only where the defendant can be said to have targeted the forum."' (quoting same)); see also
Carreras v. PMG Collins, L.L.C., 660 F.3d 549, 555 (lst Cir. 2011) ("Purposeful availment repre-
sents a rough quid pro quo: when a defendant deliberately targets its behavior toward the society
or economy of a particular forum, the forum should have the power to subject the defendant to
judgment regarding that behavior." (emphasis added) (citing McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2787-88)).
47. See McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("McIntyre UK dealt with the
United States as a single market. Like most foreign manufacturers, it was concerned not with the
prospect of suit in State X as opposed to State Y, but rather with its subjection to suit anywhere
in the United States."); id. ("Mclntyre UK, by engaging McIntyre America to promote and sell
its machines in the United States, 'purposefully availed itself' of the United States market na-
tionwide, not a market in a single State or a discrete collection of States. McIntyre UK thereby
availed itself of the market of all States in which its products were sold by its exclusive
distributor.").
48. Id. at 2789 (Kennedy, J.)..
49. Id. at 2788.
50. Similar in this regard is Justice Kennedy's statement that "[a]t no time did [J. McIntyre]
engage in any activities in New Jersey that reveal an intent to invoke or benefit from the protec-
tion of its laws." Id. at 2791. One could reasonably conclude, however, that J. McIntyre in-
tended to benefit from the protection of New Jersey law because (1) the larger market that J.
McIntyre targeted included New Jersey; and (2) the New Jersey market exists because it is sup-
ported by an array of New Jersey laws, including New Jersey's tort laws, that give its citizens
confidence to engage in economic activity knowing that they can seek compensation when other
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quires a forum-by-forum, or sovereign-by-sovereign, analysis"'" does
not resolve this issue, nor does his observation that "the United States
is a distinct sovereign. '52 Even a sovereign-by-sovereign analysis
would seem to be easily satisfied when a defendant seeks to serve a
market that unquestionably includes the territory of that sovereign.53
These problems aside, it should be emphasized that the lower
courts that have cited these more questionable assertions by Justice
Kennedy have not necessarily reached dubious outcomes as a result.54
As a practical matter, concepts of sovereignty, submission, and target-
ing are only as bad (or as good) as those concepts are defined and
applied. Still, it is noteworthy that lower courts have been accepting
such language from Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion without recog-
nizing the concerns outlined above.
B. Distinguishing McIntyre on Its Facts
Several lower court opinions have sought to distinguish McIntyre
on its facts. One state appellate court has written that, even after Mc-
Intyre, "the application of jurisdiction over a foreign defendant is
a fact-specific enterprise, which must be determined on a case-by-
case basis."56 One federal district court wrote: "At best, [McIntyre] is
economic actors breach their duties. See Steinman, supra note 7, at 494. Justice Kennedy's opin-
ion does not consider this possibility.
51. Id. at 2789.
52. Id.
53. The logical consequences of Justice Kennedy's position are potentially quite odd: "Sup-
pose a defendant seeks to serve the New York City tri-state area, which includes portions of
Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York. Would a court following Justice Kennedy's logic have
to conclude that such a defendant has not targeted any of the three states? Or suppose a defen-
dant seeks to serve an area bounded by particular latitudes and longitudes. If that area includes
State X, would courts following Justice Kennedy's approach have to conclude that the defendant
is not targeting State X because it has not explicitly defined its area of service with reference to
that state?" Steinman, supra note 7, at 493-94.
54. Several of the decisions referenced above, although they endorse more questionable
aspects of Justice Kennedy's opinion, reach sensible conclusions upholding jurisdiction over out-
of-state defendants. See, e.g., Henderson v. Laser Spine Institute, 2011 WL 4526067; S.E.C. v.
Compania Internacional Financiera S.A., No. 11 Civ.4904(DLC), 2011 WL 3251813 (S.D.N.Y.
Jul. 29, 2011).
55. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
56. State ex rel. Cooper v. NV Sumatra Tobacco Trading Co., No. M2010-01955-COA-R4-
CV, 2011 WL 2571851, at *33 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 2011); see also McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at
2801 (noting that McIntyre did not "say that use of a national distribution system should, ipso
facto, insulate a manufacturer from jurisdiction in the forum state"). The Tennessee Supreme
Court recently granted permission to appeal in Cooper, paving the way for what could be a
significant post-McIntyre state supreme court decision. See Cooper, 2011 WL 2571851 (noting
"Application for Permission to Appeal Granted by Supreme Court" on January 11, 2012); see
also Tennessee Supreme Court, Pending Case Report, available at http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/
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applicable to cases presenting the same factual scenario that it
does."1
5 7
In particular, many opinions have distinguished McIntyre by em-
phasizing (as Justice Breyer did) that the McIntyre record showed that
only one of the British manufacturer's machines-the one involved in
Mr. Nicastro's accident-had been purchased by a New Jersey cus-
tomer.58 Thus, courts have upheld jurisdiction in cases where there
had been a higher volume of sales to in-forum purchasers,59 or where
the defendant's products were available for purchase in the forum.
60
One illustrative passage comes from the following federal district
court opinion upholding jurisdiction over an Irish corporation, Mof-
fett Engineering:
default/files/docs/supremecourtpendingcasereportcurrentreport_10.pdf (Docket No. M2010-
01955-SC-Rll-CV).
57. Ainsworth v. Cargotec USA, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-236-KS-MTP, 2011 WL 4443626, at *7
(S.D. Miss. Sept. 23, 2011).
58. To this point, lower courts have not confronted the potential tension between (a) Justice
Breyer's statement that Supreme Court decisions "strongly suggest[ ] that a single sale of a prod-
uct in a State does not constitute an adequate basis for asserting jurisdiction over an out-of-state
defendant, even if that defendant places his goods in the stream of commerce, fully aware (and
hoping) that such a sale will take place," McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring),
and (b) the Court's decision in McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 US. 220 (1957), which upheld
jurisdiction in California even though the defendant had "never solicited or done any insurance
business in California apart from the policy involved here." Id. at 222. One federal court of
appeals has cited Justice Breyer's concurrence for the proposition that "[t]he Supreme Court has
never found that a single isolated sale is sufficient" to justify jurisdiction, but added that the
Court also has not "held that a single sale into a state is insufficient for due process purposes."
Red Earth L.L.C. v. United States, 657 F.3d 138, 145 (2d Cir. 2011) (emphasis added) (character-
izing the issue as "a close question of law"). For a discussion of how Justice Breyer's concur-
rence might be reconciled with McGee, see infra note 144.
59. See Brooks & Baker, LLC v. Flambeau, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-146-TJW-CE, 2011 WL
4591905, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2011) ("[Tlhe evidence shows that Flambeau made many
more than just one isolated sale to Texas."); Soria v. Chrysler Canada, Inc., 958 N.E.2d 285, 297
(Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (noting that the foreign defendant's U.S. distributor had "ordered 28,383
total vehicles of various makes and models, including minivans, for its independently-owned
dealerships in Illinois" (emphasis added)); Cooper, 2011 WL 2571851, at *33 ("Here, over 11.5
million of Sumatra's cigarettes were sold in Tennessee over a three-year period."); Russell v.
SNFA, No. 1-09-3012, 2011 WL 6965795, at *8 (Il1. App. Dec. 16, 2011) (noting that "approxi-
mately 2,198" of the defendant's parts had been sold in Illinois between 2000 and 2007 and that
"[tihus, insufficient sales is not an issue in the case before us, as it was in McIntyre").
60. See Original Creations, Inc. v. Ready America, Inc., No. 11 C 3453, 2011 WL 4738268, at
*5 (N.D. II. Oct. 5, 2011) ("In contrast [to the defendant in McIntyre], Life+Gear has sold its
products to two distributors that market to Illinois residents. In other words, Life+Gear has
taken advantage of the clearly defined distribution network offered by Meijer and West Marine,
which includes at least 21 stores in Illinois."); Dram Techs. L.L.C. v. America. II Group, Inc., No.
2:10-CV-45-TJW, 2011 WL 4591902, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2011) (noting plaintiff's research
confirming that products containing the memory chips were available for purchase in Texas
stores and "are also available for sale on the internet and Plaintiff has found internet sites that
ship these products directly to Texas").
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In McIntyre, the record only contained evidence that a single ma-
chine manufactured by the foreign defendant had been sold and
shipped to the forum state. In the present case, it is undisputed that
Cargotec has sold 203 Moffett forklifts to customers in Mississippi
over the past decade, accounting for 1.55% of Moffett's United
States sales during that time period and generating ...roughly
$5,350,000.00 in sales. That is a significant difference-one
which . . .removes the present case from the scope of McIntyre's
applicability.61
In other opinions that explicitly distinguished McIntyre on its
facts, courts have upheld jurisdiction over defendants who were aware
that their products were being purchased by forum-state customers.62
They have also upheld jurisdiction over defendants who had direct
contacts with entities in the forum state.63 In addition, lower courts
have noted that McIntyre does not modify the prevailing approach to
personal jurisdiction in cases arising from intentional torts.6 4
C. The Continued Relevance of the Two-Prong Test
According to one post-McIntyre opinion, McIntyre raises ques-
tions about the two-step jurisdictional framework that characterized
the Supreme Court's case law during the 1980s.65 Those two steps are
as follows: First, the defendant must "purposefully establish[] 'mini-
61. Ainsworth, 2011 WL 4443626, at *7. On the other hand, one lower court has used to
Justice Breyer's opinion to support the idea that a fairly small number of sales (even if there is
more than a single sale) makes jurisdiction improper. Oticon, Inc. v. Sebotek Hearing Sys.,
L.L.C., No. 08-5489(FLW), 2011 WL 3702423, at *10 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 2011) ("Under Nicastro,
whether it is five or nine sales by Sebotek of SDT's allegedly infringing products, that is simply
too small of a number from which to conclude that SDT purposefully availed itself of the New
Jersey market.").
62. Merced v. Gemstar Group, Inc., No. 10-3054, 2011 WL 5865964, at *5 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Nov.
22, 2011) ("In the present case, an invoice by Margraf, S.P.A. noted that the ultimate destination
for its shipment was Pennsylvania."); Soria, 958 N.E.2d at 297 ("Chrysler Canada is specifically
aware of the final destination of every product (i.e., vehicle) that it assembles." (emphasis in
original)).
63. Adelson v. Hananel, 652 F.3d 75, 82 (1st Cir. 2011) ("Hananel directed regular adminis-
trative and financial conduct toward Massachusetts, and his contacts with the state were volun-
tary and the result of more than just a single event or transaction. . . . [G]iven that it was
Hananel who sought this employment contract with a company whose key officers were all lo-
cated in Massachusetts and whose financial accounts were all administered out of Massachusetts,
the court properly concluded that Hananel had purposefully availed himself of Massachusetts
law.").
64. See Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1228-29 (9th Cir. 2011)
(stating that McIntyre was "consistent" with "the Calder 'effects' test" and that Justice Ken-
nedy's opinion "distinguish[ed] intentional tort cases from cases governed by [the] 'general
rule"' requiring "purposeful availment"); CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d
1066, 1077 (9th Cir. 2011) (same).
65. See infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
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mum contacts' in the forum State."66 Second, "[o]nce it has been de-
cided that a defendant purposefully established minimum contacts
within the forum State, these contacts may be considered in light of
other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdic-
tion would comport with 'fair play and substantial justice.' "67 Factors
relevant to this second prong-which would confirm "the reasonable-
ness of jurisdiction" 68-include "'the burden on the defendant,' 'the
forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute,' 'the plaintiff's inter-
est in obtaining convenient and effective relief,' 'the interstate judicial
system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of contro-
versies,' and the 'shared interest of the several States in furthering
fundamental substantive social policies.' "69
One federal district court opinion stated that "[a]fter McIntyre,
the relevance of fairness as part of the jurisdictional inquiry is un-
clear."7 It noted:
In J. McIntyre Machinery, the plurality did not use the traditional
two-step analysis-looking first at minimum contacts and second at
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Instead, the
plurality focused on whether the defendant purposefully availed it-
self of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State.71
The opinion then cited Justice Kennedy's statement that "a rule
based on general notions of fairness and foreseeability, is inconsistent
with the premises of lawful judicial power."72 The court apparently
viewed Justice Breyer's concurrence as preserving the second prong of
the jurisdictional inquiry, noting Justice Breyer's statement that "on
the record present here, resolving this case requires no more than ad-
hering to our precedents."73
Ultimately, this lower court opinion saw no need to resolve the
issue, because it concluded that jurisdiction over the defendants in
that case was consistent with both the minimum-contacts and fairness
66. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S.
at 316).
67. Id. at 474 (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316).
68. Id. at 478.
69. Id. at 477 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292
(1980)).
70. Kidston v. Resources Planning Corp., No. 2:11-cv-2036-PMD. 2011 WL 6115293, at *3
n.2 (D.S.C. Dec. 8, 2011).
71. Id.
72. Id. (quoting McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J.)).
73. Id. (quoting McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring)).
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inquiries.7 4 Nonetheless, the opinion flags an important point. Sev-
eral scholars have questioned the value of inquiring into fairness or
reasonableness as a distinct, additional prerequisite for jurisdiction.75
Such considerations might instead be addressed through forum non
conveniens or some other non-jurisdictional inquiry,76 or perhaps with
a more flexible understanding of minimum contacts.77
Putting aside the normative merits of that argument, it would be
wrong to read McIntyre as interring that second step in the jurisdic-
tional framework. As a logical matter, there was no need for either
Justice Kennedy or Justice Breyer to confront the reasonableness or
fairness factors.78 They had each concluded that J. McIntyre had not
purposefully established minimum contacts with New Jersey, which is
the first requirement of the traditional test.
79
It is possible, moreover, that the reasonableness or fairness fac-
tors will play a significant role if the Supreme Court revisits jurisdic-
74. Id. at *4 (concluding that the plaintiff's "allegations are sufficient to make a prima facie
showing that the exercise of jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice").
75. See, e.g., Linda Silberman, Goodyear and Nicastro: Observations from a Transnational
and Comparative Perspective, 63 S.C. L. REV. 591, 595 (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Silber-
man, Observations]; see also Linda Silberman, "Two Cheers" for International Shoe (and None
for Asahi): An Essay on the Fiftieth Anniversary of International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAvis L. REV.
755, 758-59 (1995) [hereinafter Silberman, "Two Cheers"]; Howard B. Stravitz, Sayonora to Min-
imum Contacts: Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 39 S.C. L. REV. 729, 805-10 (1988);
Louise Weinberg, The Place of Trial and the Law Applied: Overhauling Constitutional Theory, 59
U. COLO. L REV. 67, 102 (1987); see also James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of
Judicial Jurisdiction: Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169, 227-28 (2004) (not-
ing that some of the Supreme Court's "second stage balancing factors.., are difficult to concep-
tualize as due process requirements" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
76. See Silberman, "Two Cheers," supra note 75 at 762 (arguing that "American jurisdic-
tional theory" might "benefit ... from a look at the experience of other countries" and noting
that under English law, "notions of 'fairness' are introduced as a matter of judicial discretion,
similar to considerations of forum non conveniens"); Stravitz, supra note 75, at 811 ("Forum non
conveniens can deal more appropriately with the highly fact-specific determination of litigational
convenience than can the fairness branch with its amorphous fluid balancing of interests.");
Weinberg, supra note 75, at 102 ("Given the availability of forum non conveniens, and indepen-
dent review of choice of law for fundamental fairness, defendants simply do not need all of the
constitutional protection from plaintiff's choice of forum that the Supreme Court keeps lavishing
on them.")
77. See Silberman, "Two Cheers," supra note 75 at 758-59 (arguing that the minimum con-
tacts test, properly understood, "require[d] that the defendant's activities in the state be bal-
anced against the state's regulatory and litigation interests-hence the requirement that the
defendant have 'certain minimum contacts ... such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice"' and that, therefore, "the level of
contacts required depended on the particular nature of the claim, the type of litigation, and
possibly the parties" (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316) (ellipses in original)).
78. See Silberman, Observations, supra note 75.
79. See McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2790 (Kennedy, J.); id. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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tional doctrine in the future. This is especially so in light of Justice
Breyer's concurrence, which expressed concern for smaller manufac-
turers-both foreign and domestic:
What might appear fair in the case of a large manufacturer which
specifically seeks, or expects, an equal-sized distributor to sell its
product in a distant State might seem unfair in the case of a small
manufacturer (say, an Appalachian potter) who sells his product
(cups and saucers) exclusively to a large distributor, who resells a
single item (a coffee mug) to a buyer from a distant State
(Hawaii). °
He continued:
It may be fundamentally unfair to require a small Egyptian shirt
maker, a Brazilian manufacturing cooperative, or a Kenyan coffee
farmer, selling its products through international distributors, to re-
spond to products-liability tort suits in virtually every State in the
United States, even those in respect to which the foreign firm has no
connection at all but the sale of a single (allegedly defective)
good.8
In either one of these situations, the second-step, reasonableness
factors might vindicate Justice Breyer's concerns for smaller defend-
ants without having to interpret the first-step, minimum-contacts anal-
ysis in a way that could foreclose jurisdiction over larger, more
sophisticated manufacturers as well.8 2 At the very least, these consid-
erations suggest caution before concluding that McIntyre calls into
question this part of the prevailing jurisdictional framework.
80. Id. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 2794; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 52, available at http://www.
supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/09-1343.pdf (comment by Justice
Breyer) ("I just read in the paper the other day there's some Ethiopian or some foreign coun-
try-it's a very poor country-and they're selling goats, and they're sending some to the United
States for some kind of festival purpose or something. Now, he said, I have a site on the
Internet.").
82. As Justice Ginsburg noted in her McIntyre dissent, "considerations of litigational conve-
nience and the respective situations of the parties" could justify denying jurisdiction over a "de-
fendant is a natural or legal person whose economic activities and legal involvements are largely
home-based, i.e., entities without designs to gain substantial revenue from sales in distant mar-
kets." McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). One might also treat such defend-
ants differently under the first prong of the jurisdictional framework; arguably a defendant who
lacks "designs to gain substantial revenue from sales in distant markets," id., does not seek to
serve those markets and, therefore, has not purposefully established minimum contacts with
them. See Steinman, supra note 7, at 506 (discussing this possible understanding of Justice Gins-
burg's dissent). That said, Justice Ginsburg's McIntyre dissent may reflect an approach to juris-
diction that does not draw a stark boundary between the two inquiries that crystallized during
the 1980s. Id. at 507 ("Justice Ginsburg seemlessly presents fairly arguments that sound in both
the first and the second prongs" (footnotes omitted)).
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D. The Relationship Between the Three McIntyre Opinions
Because no opinion in McIntyre garners a majority of the Justices,
any careful attempt to extract broader legal principles from McIntyre
must consider how the three McIntyre opinions relate to one another.
Several lower court decisions-state and federal-have concluded
that Justice Kennedy's four-Justice plurality opinion cannot constitute
the Supreme Court's holding in McIntyre.83 One state court opinion,
for example, wrote that Justice Kennedy's plurality "rejected a line of
cases which it indicated have 'made foreseeability the touchstone of
jurisdiction,"' but concluded that "[t]he plurality opinion alone cannot
overrule this line of cases."' 84  A federal district court opinion ob-
served that "[t]he plurality opinion by Justice Kennedy... announced
a standard for specific personal jurisdiction that is arguably stricter
than the Supreme Court's previous standards," but made clear that
"the plurality opinion by Justice Kennedy is not the precedential hold-
ing of the Supreme Court.
85
On this point, these opinions and others recognize the impact of
the so-called Marks rule.86 In Marks v. United States,87 the Supreme
Court explained that "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and
no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Jus-
tices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds. '88  Several lower court opinions have stated that Justice
Breyer's concurring opinion constitutes the McIntyre holding under
Marks.89
83. See infra notes 84-89 and accompanying text. The opinions discussed supra Part II.A
have not stated that Justice Kennedy's opinion alone constitutes the Court's holding, although it
is troubling that those opinions cite controversial aspects of Justice Kennedy's plurality without
recognizing that they are in tension with earlier Supreme Court opinions. Every court to con-
sider the issue explicitly has rejected the idea that Justice Kennedy's opinion alone is the McIn-
tyre holding.
84. Esoterix Genetic Labs., L.L.C. v. McKey, No. 11 CVS 1379, 2011 WL 3667698, at *8
(N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 22, 2011).
85. Dram, 2011 WL 4591902, at *2.
86. Id.; Esoterix, 2011 WL 3667698, at *8 (same); see also infra note 89.
87. 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
88. Id. at 193.
89. See UTC Fire & Security Americas Corp. v. NCS Power, Inc., No. 10 Civ.
6692(LTS)(THK), 2012 WL 423349, at *8 & n.6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2012) ("[Blecause no opinion
in J. McIntyre commanded five votes, Justice Breyer's concurrence controls." (citing Marks));
Bluestone Innovations Texas, 2011 WL 4591922, at *3 & n.3 (calling Justice Breyer's concurrence
"[t]he controlling opinion"); Ainsworth v. Cargotex USA, Inc., 2011 WL 6291812, at *2 (S.D.
Miss. Dec. 15, 2011) ("[I]n applying [McIntyre], the Court must consider Justice Breyer's concur-
ring opinion as the holding of the Court, as he concurred in the judgment on the narrowest
grounds.").
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Lower courts seem to disagree, however, on what Justice Breyer's
opinion stands for. One wrote that Justice Breyer does not commit to
any particular jurisdictional standard and "would defer establishing a
specific standard to a subsequent case."9 0 Another wrote:
Justice Breyer expressly declined to address the Supreme Court's
split in Asahi as to whether mere foreseeability is a constitutionally
sufficient basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction under the
stream-of-commerce theory. Instead, he considered McIntyre's facts
according to each side of the Asahi split and concluded that the re-
cord contained insufficient evidence to justify the exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction under either analysis.
91
Other decisions, by contrast, have read Justice Breyer (and Jus-
tice Kennedy as well) to endorse Justice O'Connor's approach in
Asahi, thereby creating a majority holding on that principle. One fed-
eral district court opinion stated: "As this Court interprets McIntyre,
the 'common denominator of the Court's reasoning' and 'a position
approved by at least five Justices who support the judgment' is the
'stream-of-commerce plus' rubric enunciated in an opinion by Justice
O'Connor in Asahi." A similar sentiment was expressed by one
state appellate court, which wrote that McIntyre "resolved" the ques-
tion that had been "left open in Asahi... of whether placing products
into the stream of commerce in a foreign country (or another state),
aware that some may or will be swept into the forum state, is enough
to subject a defendant to personal jurisdiction-or whether due pro-
90. Esoterix, 2011 WL 3667698, at *8.
91. Ainsworth v. Cargotec USA, Inc., 2011 WL 6291812, at *2 (citations omitted); see also
id., 2011 WL 4443626, at *7 (Sept. 23, 2011) ("[R]ather than select one of the Supreme Court's
past opinions as the controlling precedent to be applied in every case thereafter, Justice Breyer
merely found that the plaintiff had failed to present evidence of purposeful availment under any
of the Court's past opinions. He did not choose one of the Asahi plurality opinions as the con-
trolling precedent." (emphasis in original)); Oticon, Inc. v. Sebotek Hearing Sys., WL 3702423, at
*9 ("Justice Breyer also emphasized that he was not ready to announce his own version of a
stream-of-commerce test."); Sieg v. Sears Roebuck & Co., No. 3:10cv606, 2012 WL 610961, at *5
(M.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2012) (noting "the failure of a Supreme Court majority [in McIntyre] to adopt
clearly one of the two Asahi standards"); see also Original Creations, 2011 WL 4738268, at *4 ("I
find that [McIntyre] do[es] not overturn the [Supreme] Court's earlier articulations of the stream
of commerce theory.").
92. Smith v. Teledyne Continental Motors, Inc., No. 9:10cv2152, 9:10cv2546, 2012 WL
10836, at *2 (D.S.C. Jan.3, 2012); see also id. at *3 ("This view has come to be known as the
'stream-of-commerce plus' test. Although it did not win the support of a majority of the Court in
Asahi, in the view of this Court, it has now done so in McIntyre."); Northern Ins. Co. v. Con-
struction Navale Bordeaux, No. 11-60462-CV, 2011 WL 2682950, at *5 (S.D. Fla. July 11, 2011)
(citing Justice Breyer's concurrence for the proposition that "'something more' than merely
placing a product into the stream of commerce is required for personal jurisdiction").
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cess requires that the defendant have engaged in additional conduct,
directed at the forum.
93
Lower courts have also framed their discussions of the McIntyre
opinions in terms of foreseeability. Justice Kennedy aggressively criti-
ques the relevance of foreseeability to determining the permissible
scope of jurisdiction.94 Lower courts have divided, however, over
whether Justice Breyer's concurrence shares Justice Kennedy's view.
One federal district court, for example, wrote that "Justice Breyer de-
clined to adopt the plurality's holding that mere foreseeability that
goods could wind up in a particular state could never form a constitu-
tionally sufficient basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction under
the stream-of-commerce theory."95 Another, however, "construes
McIntyre as rejecting the foreseeability standard of personal jurisdic-
tion," stating that this position "now commands the assent of six Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court."96
Finally, some lower courts have found in McIntyre a general prin-
ciple that targeting the United States as a national market does not
constitute targeting markets of the individual states that comprise the
United States. According to one federal district court, "there is no
doubt that Nicastro stands for the proposition that targeting the na-
93. Dow Chemical Canada v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. App. 4th 170, 172-73 (2011). An
earlier decision in this case by the California appellate court was the subject of a U.S. Supreme
Court petition for certiorari. After McIntyre, the Supreme Court vacated the earlier decision
and remanded for further consideration in light of McIntyre, see Dow Chemical Canada ULC v.
Fandino, 131 S. Ct. 2088 (2011), which led to the opinion quoted in the text.
94. See infra notes 101-102 and accompanying text.
95. UTC Fire & Security Americas Corp. v. NCS Power, Inc., 2012 WL 423349, at *8; see
also Ainsworth v. Cargotec USA, Inc., 2011 WL 4443626, at *7 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 23, 2011) ("[Jus-
tice Breyer] did not reject the notion that mere foreseeability or awareness is a constitutionally
sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction if the defendant's product made its way into the forum
state while still in the stream of commerce.").
96. Windsor v. Spinner Indus. Co., Ltd., No. JKB-10-114, 2011 WL 5005199, *4-5 (D. Md.
Oct. 20, 2011); see also id. at *4 ("McIntyre clearly rejects foresecability as the standard for
personal jurisdiction"); see also Oticon, Inc. v. Sebotek Hearing Sys., 2011 WL 3702423, at *9
("Justice Breyer, in his concurrence, would not adopt as strict a rule as that enunciated by the
plurality, but he too voiced his disagreement with the notion that mere foreseeability is the
cornerstone of the stream-of-commerce jurisprudence."); id. at *12 ("Neither knowledge or ex-
pectation of sales to a particular forum state is enough to establish jurisdiction according to both
the plurality opinion and the concurring opinion."). One district court, quoting Justice Breyer,
characterized both Kennedy and Breyer as "rejecting rule that a producer is subject to jurisdic-
tion for a products-liability action so long as it 'knows or reasonably should know that its prod-
ucts are distributed through a nationwide distribution system that might lead to those products
being sold in any of the fifty states." Furminator, Inc. v. Wahba, No. 4:10CV01941 AGF, 2011
WL 3847390, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 29, 2011) (quoting McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J.)
(emphasis by Justice Breyer)). For a discussion of this language from Justice Breyer's concur-
rence, see infra notes 116-118 and accompanying text.
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tional market is not enough to impute jurisdiction to all the forum
States."97 Others, however, have continued to recognize that seeking
to serve the U.S. market as a whole manifests an intention to serve the
states that comprise it. As one Texas federal court explained in up-
holding jurisdiction: "[the defendant] has admitted that it inserted the
accused products into the stream of commerce with the intention that
the products reach a national market-that is, [the defendant] in-
tended Texas consumers to purchase the products at issue in this
lawsuit."98
The divisions described above concern some of the most crucial
questions about what the McIntyre decision stands for. Correctly an-
swering these questions requires understanding the relationship be-
tween the three McIntyre opinions. In particular, they hinge on
Justice Breyer's concurring opinion (joined by Justice Alito), because
that opinion ultimately provided the fifth (and sixth) votes rejecting
jurisdiction in McIntyre. The next two Parts of this Essay explore
these issues. As described below, McIntyre should not be read to
mandate a more restrictive approach to personal jurisdiction.
III. MCINTYRE, FORESEEABILITY, AND ASAHI
Two issues over which lower courts have divided after McIntyre
are (1) the role of "foreseeability" in assessing jurisdiction over an
out-of-state defendant 99; and (2) whether the disagreement between
Justice O'Connor and Justice Brennan in Asahi has been resolved in
favor of one or the other.100 It is not clear that answering either of
97. Oticon, Inc. v. Sebotek Hearing Sys., 2011 WL 3702423, at *9 (emphasis in original); see
also Dow Chemical Canada, 202 Cal. App. 4th at 176-77 ([McIntyre] "considered whether the
State of New Jersey could exercise jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer solely because the
manufacturer targeted the United States market for the sale of its product, which was purchased
by a forum state consumer."). Related to this point, the district court in Oticon stated that
McIntyre had therefore "overruled the line of cases exemplified by Tobin, Barone, and Power
Integrations," 2011 WL 3702423, at *9, referring to several pre-Mclntyre decisions, two of which
Justice Ginsburg had cited approvingly in her McIntyre dissent. See 131 S. Ct. at 2805 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (citing Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co., 25 F.3d 610, 613-15
(8th Cir. 1994); Tobin v. Astra Pharmaceutical Prods., Inc., 993 F.2d 528, 544 (6th Cir. 1993)); see
also Power Integrations, Inc. v. BCD Semiconductor Corp., 547 F. Supp. 2d 365, 373 (D. Del.
2008).
98. Brooks & Baker v. Flambeau, 2011 WL 4591905, at *4; see also Soria, 958 N.E.2d at 297
(Ill. App. 2011) (noting that "Chrysler Canada indirectly shipped products into the American
market, including Illinois, through Chrysler United States, its parent corporation" and that
"Chrysler Canada continuously and intentionally serves or targets this market and is set up to
manufacture vehicles for (and derives significant revenue from) the United States market, includ-
ing Chrysler dealerships throughout Illinois." (emphasis added)).
99. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
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these questions in the abstract will provide much meaningful guidance
on whether or not jurisdiction is proper in any given case going for-
ward. But since the issue has attracted the attention of lower courts in
the wake of McIntyre, it is worth taking a look at what the McIntyre
opinions say about these issues.
With respect to foreseeability, Justice Kennedy's McIntyre plural-
ity expended several paragraphs criticizing an approach to jurisdiction
that would "discard[ ] the central concept of sovereign authority in
favor of considerations of fairness and foreseeability."' ' He added
that "it is the defendant's actions, not his expectations, that empower
a State's courts to subject him to judgment.
10 2
Oddly, these parts of Justice Kennedy's opinion purported to
challenge views exclusive to Justice Brennan's non-majority Asahi
concurrence. Justice Kennedy wrote: "It was the premise of [Justice
Brennan's] concurring opinion that the defendant's ability to antici-
pate suit renders the assertion of jurisdiction fair. In this way, the
opinion made foreseeability the touchstone of jurisdiction." 0 3 In fact,
it was the World-Wide Volkswagen majority that endorsed "foresee-
ability" as relevant to the constitutionality of jurisdiction,10 4 writing
that it was "critical to due process analysis" that "the defendant's con-
duct and connection with the forum State are such that he should rea-
sonably anticipate being haled into court there."1 °5 Additionally, it was
the World-Wide Volkswagen majority that declared that a state may
"assert[] personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its
products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they
will be purchased by consumers in the forum State."1 0 6
Admittedly, there is potentially a circular quality to World-Wide
Volkswagen's idea that jurisdiction must be "foreseeable" in the sense
101. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2788 (Kennedy, J.).
102. Id. at 2789.
103. Id. at 2788.
104. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286, 297 ("This is not to say, of course, that foresee-
ability is wholly irrelevant.").
105. Id. (emphasis added). Indeed, that is precisely how Justice Brennan used the idea of
foreseeability in his Asahi concurrence. Quoting World-Wide Volkswagen verbatim, Justice
Brennan wrote:
This is not to say, of course, that foreseeability is wholly irrelevant. But the foreseeabil-
ity that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will
find its way into the forum State. Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and connec-
tion with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into
Court there.
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 119 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at
297).
106. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298 (emphasis added) (citing Gray v. Am. Radia-
tor & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (Il1. 1961)).
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that defendants "should reasonably anticipate being haled into court"
in the forum state."°7 It is, after all, the jurisdictional principles them-
selves that would make jurisdiction foreseeable. 10 8 That said, it is in-
accurate to say that the principle expressed in World-Wide
Volkswagen and in Justice Brennan's Asahi concurrence would vest
jurisdiction based on a defendant's "expectations" alone. 109 When a
defendant "delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the
expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum
State,""'1 jurisdiction is based on an action ("deliver[ing] its products
into the stream of commerce") that is taken with a particular expecta-
tion ("that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State").
Whatever the merits of Justice Kennedy's arguments, one cannot
plausibly read Justice Breyer's concurring opinion as adopting them.
Most significantly, Justice Breyer quoted and applied the very lan-
guage from World-Wide Volkswagen described above. He concluded
that Mr. Nicastro had failed to show that J. McIntyre had either "'pur-
posefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities' within
New Jersey" or had "delivered its goods in the stream of commerce
'with the expectation that they will be purchased' by New Jersey
users."'1 1 That last clause-inquiring whether J. McIntyre had "deliv-
ered its goods in the stream of commerce 'with the expectation that
they will be purchased' by New Jersey users"-is straight from World-
Wide Volkswagen and Justice Brennan's Asahi concurrence." 2
Accordingly (and contrary to the views of some post-McIntyre
lower courts1 3), it is wrong to read Justice Breyer as rejecting Justice
107. Id. at 297.
108. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theo-
retical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 1112, 1134 (1981) ("[A] potential defendant can only have
such an expectation because the law so provides.").
109. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J.).
110. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298.
111. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring).
112. Some of the lower court opinions described above have selectively quoted from Justice
Breyer's concurrence to omit this part of his analysis. In Dow Chemical Canada, for example,
the California Court of Appeals wrote:
The concurrence [by Justice Breyer] noted no evidence of a "regular course" of sales in
New Jersey, but it continued its assessment by pointing out: "there is no 'something
more,' such as special state-related design, advertising, advice, marketing, or anything
else. Mr. Nicastro, who here bears the burden of proving jurisdiction, has shown no
specific effort by the British Manufacturer to sell in New Jersey."
202 Cal. App. 4th at 178 (quoting McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792-93 (Breyer, J., concurring)).
113. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
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Brennan's Asahi opinion in favor of Justice O'Connor's.'14 Likewise,
Justice Breyer's opinion does not preclude consideration of foresee-
ability and a defendant's expectations. Again, his opinion considered
whether the defendant had "delivered its goods in the stream of com-
merce 'with the expectation that they will be purchased' by New
Jersey users""'; he simply concluded that the McIntyre defendant had
not done so.
Justice Breyer did reject one approach to determining the permis-
sible scope of jurisdiction-one that he called "the absolute approach
adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court and urged by [Mr. Nicas-
tro] and his amici."116 Under this view, "a producer is subject to juris-
diction so long as it 'knows or reasonably should know that its
products are distributed through a nationwide distribution system that
might lead to those products being sold in any of the fifty states.' "117
Notably, Justice Breyer did not attribute this view to Justice Ginsburg
and the McIntyre dissenters. And rightly so. Justice Ginsburg's dis-
sent was not based on the "absolute approach" that Justice Breyer
criticized. Rather Justice Ginsburg's approach was grounded in pur-
poseful availment, pure and simple:
McIntyre UK, by engaging McIntyre America to promote and sell
its machines in the United States, 'purposefully availed itself' of the
United States market nationwide, not a market in a single State or a
discrete collection of States. McIntyre UK thereby availed itself of
the market of all States in which its products were sold by its exclu-
sive distributor.
118
Accordingly, just as it is too simplistic to characterize Justice
Breyer as "rejecting the foreseeability standard of personal jurisdic-
tion,""' 9 it is too simplistic to characterize Justice Ginsburg as "em-
bracing foreseeability as the standard of personal jurisdiction." 2 °
Relatedly, Justice Ginsburg's conclusion did not rest on a rejection of
Justice O'Connor's Asahi logic in favor of Justice Brennan's. Justice
Ginsburg's McIntyre dissent is entirely consistent with Justice
O'Connor's requirement that a defendant must engage in conduct that
"indicate[s] an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum
114. On this issue, the opinions discussed supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text, have it
right: Justice Breyer "did not choose one of the Asahi plurality opinions as the controlling prece-
dent." Ainsworth v. Cargotec USA, Inc., 2011 WL 4443626, at *7 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 23, 2011).
115. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 2793.
117. Id. (quoting Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d at 592).
118. Id. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
119. Windsor, 2011 WL 5005199, *4-5; see also supra note 96.
120. Windsor, 2011 WL 5005199, at *3.
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State. ' 121 Justice Ginsburg merely recognized the geographic fact that
the market of the United States includes the individual states that
comprise it. Indeed, Justice O'Connor's Asahi opinion cited with ap-
proval two district court cases that had upheld jurisdiction on the the-
ory that efforts to serve the U.S. market as a whole constitute
purposeful efforts to serve the individual states that comprise the
United States.122 Although that scenario was not present in Asahi,
Justice O'Connor's citation to those cases confirms that there is no
fundamental conflict between her approach to minimum contacts and
upholding jurisdiction in a case like McIntyre.
IV. UNDERSTANDING JUSTICE BREYER'S CONCURRENCE
At the end of the day, any attempt to extract broader legal princi-
ples from the fractured McIntyre decision will have to grapple with
Justice Breyer's concurrence. Several lower courts have declared that
Justice Breyer's opinion constitutes the McIntyre holding under the
"narrowest grounds" rule of Marks v. United States.t 23 Although the
contours of the Marks rule are murky in some regards, t24 Marks cer-
tainly means that Justice Kennedy's four-Justice plurality cannot,
standing alone, constitute the Supreme Court's holding in McIntyre.
If any opinion qualifies under Marks as the one "concur[ring] ... on
121. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112.
122. See id. at 112-13 (citing Hicks v. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, 452 F. Supp. 130 (M.D. Pa.
1978), and Rockwell International Corp. v. Costruzioni Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta, 553 F.
Supp. 328 (E.D. Pa. 1982)); Rockwell, 553 F. Supp. at 330, 334 (noting that the defendant was
"aware that the A-109 helicopter was targeted for the executive corporate transport market in
the United States and Europe" and that "[g]iven the distribution system, [the defendant] had
ample reason to know and expect that its bearing, as a unique part of a larger product, would be
marketed in any or all states, including the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania"); Hicks, 452 F.
Supp. at 134 (upholding jurisdiction in Pennsylvania over a Japanese motorcycle manufacturer's
"indirect shipments of goods into the state" by its U.S. distributor, even though "the product was
not directly placed in the state by [the Japanese manufacturer] but rather was marketed by one
whom the [manufacturer] could foresee would cause the product to enter Pennsylvania"). For a
more detailed discussion of Rockwell and Hicks, see Steinman, supra note 7, at 500-01.
123. 430 U.S. 188 (1977); see supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745 (1994) (stating that the Marks test
"is more easily stated than applied to the various opinions supporting the result in Baldasar Iv.
Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980)]"); id. at 745-46 (concluding that it is "not useful to pursue the
Marks inquiry to the utmost logical possibility when it has so obviously baffled and divided the
lower courts that have considered it," noting the view of some lower courts that "there is no
lowest common denominator or 'narrowest grounds' that represents the Court's holding"); see
also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (citing and quoting Nichols and stating that
the Marks test "is more easily stated than applied to the various opinion supporting the result in
[Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)]" and that "[iut does not seem useful to
pursue the Marks inquiry to the utmost logical possibility when it has so obviously baffled and
divided the lower courts that have considered it" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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the narrowest grounds,, 125 it would be Justice Breyer's. Put slightly
differently, one would be hard-pressed to find in McIntyre a fifth vote
for any new refinement of jurisdictional doctrine unless it appears in
Justice Breyer's concurring opinion.
With respect to the overarching legal principles, Justice Breyer's
concurring opinion shares more similarities with Justice Ginsburg's
dissent than Justice Kennedy's plurality. For one thing, Justice Breyer
affirmatively rejected significant aspects of Justice Kennedy's reason-
ing. He wrote: "The plurality seems to state strict rules that limit juris-
diction where a defendant does not intend to submit to the power of a
sovereign and cannot be said to have targeted the forum.... I do not
agree with the plurality's seemingly strict no-jurisdiction rule." '126
By contrast, Justice Breyer did not critique the legal standards
employed by Justice Ginsburg. As discussed above, Justice Breyer
criticized an "absolute approach" that he attributed to the New Jersey
Supreme Court, not to Justice Ginsburg and the dissenters. 127 The
key disagreement between Justice Breyer and Justice Ginsburg was
not about the fundamental legal principles, but rather about what
facts were properly considered in deciding the case.128
Justice Breyer's view of the factual record in McIntyre is crucial
to making sense of his concurrence. He proceeded on the assumption
that the only facts offered in support of jurisdiction were the
following:
(1) The American Distributor on one occasion sold and shipped one
machine to a New Jersey customer, namely, Mr. Nicastro's em-
ployer, Mr. Curcio; (2) the British Manufacturer permitted, indeed
wanted, its independent American Distributor to sell its machines
to anyone in America willing to buy them; and (3) representatives
of the British Manufacturer attended trade shows in such cities as
Chicago, Las Vegas, New Orleans, Orlando, San Diego, and San
Francisco.129
What is so telling about Justice Breyer's recounting of the factual
record in McIntyre is that it excised J. McIntyre's overarching purpose
of accessing the entire U.S. market for its products. Whereas Justice
125. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193.
126. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring).
127. See supra notes 116-118 and accompanying text.
128. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("There may well have been other
facts that Mr. Nicastro could have demonstrated in support of jurisdiction. And the dissent
considers some of those facts .... I would take the facts precisely as the New Jersey Supreme
Court stated them.").
129. Id. at 2791 (calling these the "three primary facts" on which the New Jersey Supreme
Court "relied most heavily").
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Ginsburg saw a defendant who "engaged" a U.S. distributor in order
"to promote and sell its machines in the United States,"1 30 and who
took "purposeful step[s] to reach customers for its products anywhere
in the United States, ' 131 Justice Breyer saw a defendant who passively
"permitted" and "wanted" such sales to occur.132  With the record
framed as Justice Breyer does, it is hard to see how a jurisdictional
standard that hinges on a defendant's "purpose[ ],133 could ever be
satisfied.
Justice Breyer's narrow view of the factual record also explains
how he was able to reach the conclusion that J. McIntyre had not even
"delivered its goods in the stream of commerce with the expectation
that they will be purchased by New Jersey users. '1 34 In this regard,
much can be learned from what Justice Breyer noted was missing from
the factual record. Specifically, Justice Breyer indicated that a differ-
ent result could be justified if the record contained "a list of potential
New Jersey customers who might have regularly attended the trade
shows" that J. McIntyre officials attended'35 ; if the record had con-
tained evidence of "the size and scope of New Jersey's scrap-metal
business""'; or if the record revealed more than a single sale to a New
Jersey customer.
137
In recognizing that these facts could tip the scale in favor of juris-
diction, Justice Breyer's opinion can be reconciled with Justice Gins-
burg's idea that minimum contacts are established when a defendant
"seek[s] to exploit a multistate or global market" that includes the
130. Id. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 2797.
132. Id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring).
133. Id. at 2793 (noting the constitutional demand for "minimum contacts" and "purposeful
availment").
134. Id. at 2792.
135. Id. ("He has introduced no list of potential New Jersey customers who might, for exam-
ple, have regularly attended trade shows."); cf id. at 2796 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing a
2011 member directory listing nearly 100 New Jersey business as belonging to the industry group
that sponsored the trade shows).
136. Id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting these as "other facts that Mr. Nicastro could
have demonstrated in support of jurisdiction"); cf. id. at 2795 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing
2008 data on scrap metal recycling in New Jersey).
137. See id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that on his view of the record J. McIn-
tyre's "American Distributor on one occasion sold and shipped one machine to a New Jersey
customer, namely, Mr. Nicastro's employer, Mr. Curcio); id. at 2792 (relying on the premise that
all three opinions in Asahi "strongly suggested that a single sale of a product in a State does not
constitute an adequate basis for asserting jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, even if that
defendant places his goods in the stream of commerce, fully aware (and hoping) that such a sale
will take place" (citing Asahi, 480 U.S. at 111, 112 (O'Connor, J.); id. at 117 (Brennan, J.); id., at
122 (Stevens, J.))).
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forum state. 38 Justice Breyer would just need a showing that poten-
tial New Jersey customers existed, thus creating an "expectation that
[the defendant's products] will be purchased by New Jersey users.
1 39
If the record had contained "a list of potential New Jersey customers
who might have regularly attended the trade shows" that J. McIntyre
officials attended,14 ° or evidence of "the size and scope of New
Jersey's scrap-metal business,' 41 then that could create an expecta-
tion of purchases by New Jersey consumers. Either fact would con-
firm-even before any sales were made-that there was a potential
market for J. McIntyre's products in New Jersey.
Even without such facts, the consummation of an actual sale to a
New Jersey customer could create that expectation going forward.142
At that point, J. McIntyre either would know or should know of the
potential New Jersey market for its machines.1 43 The purposeful act
of delivering its product into the stream of commerce with that expec-
tation would justify jurisdiction when the product is purchased and
causes injury in New Jersey.1 44 For Justice Breyer, however, no such
138. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring).
140. Id.; see supra note 135.
141. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring); see supra note 136.
142. Although Justice Breyer notes that "the relevant facts found by the New Jersey Su-
preme Court show no regular flow or regular course of sales in New Jersey," McIntyre, 131 S. Ct.
at 2792 (internal quotation marks omitted), he does not state that such a "regular flow" is re-
quired for jurisdiction to be proper. A "regular flow or regular course of sales in New Jersey"
would have been sufficient for jurisdiction, id., but Justice Breyer makes clear that Mr. Nicastro
might also have "otherwise shown that the British Manufacturer ... delivered its goods in the
stream of commerce 'with the expectation that they will be purchased' by New Jersey users." Id.
(emphasis added) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98).
143. Accordingly, such additional facts would justify jurisdiction without adopting the "abso-
lute approach" that Justice Breyer rejects. Id. at 2793. Under that approach, "a producer is
subject to jurisdiction for a products-liability action so long as it 'knows or reasonably should
know that its products are distributed through a nationwide distribution system that might lead
to those products being sold in any of the fifty states."' Id. (quoting 987 A.2d at 592) Facts
confirming the existence of actual or potential customers in the forum create an "expectation
that [the defendant's products] will be purchased" by users in the forum, id. at 2792, rather than
the mere speculation that a distribution system "might lead to those products being sold in any
of the fifty states." Id. at 2793.
144. See supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text. Justice Breyer's concurrence, there-
fore, should not be read as endorsing a strict rule that jurisdiction is never proper when only a
single sale is made to an in-forum purchaser. If an expectation of in-forum purchases is shown
by other evidence, see supra text accompanying notes 139-141, then jurisdiction might be proper
even if only a single sale is ultimately made. This understanding also reconciles Justice Breyer's
concurrence with McGee. See supra note 58. The defendant in McGee had only a single cus-
tomer in the forum (California), but it had a direct relationship with that customer and was
unquestionably aware that it was providing life insurance to a California purchaser during the
course of that relationship.
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expectation is created when (1) there is only a single sale of the defen-
dant's product to a customer in the forum state, and (2) there is no
other evidence in the record suggesting potential customers in the fo-
rum state.
One can envision situations where some facts of the sort Justice
Breyer identified would be necessary to create a true expectation of
purchases by customers in the forum state. Consider, for example,
scenarios where a defendant seeks to access the U.S. market as a
whole but, as a practical matter, the market for the defendant's prod-
ucts exists only in some states (and not others). A manufacturer of
grapefruit-harvesting equipment might engage a distributor to access
the entire U.S. market, but that would not necessarily create an expec-
tation of purchases by users in Alaska, North Dakota, or other states
where grapefruit are not harvested. A manufacturer of cross-country
skis might engage a distributor to access the entire U.S. market, but
that would not necessarily create an expectation of purchases by users
in Florida, Hawaii, or other states where cross-country skiing does not
take place.
This is not to say that the machinery at issue in McIntyre
presented such a scenario. But if we accept the premise that the bur-
den is on the plaintiff to establish personal jurisdiction over the defen-
dant,'145 one might need some evidence to confirm that a potential
market exists in the particular state within the United States that seeks
to exercise jurisdiction. Such an approach is not fundamentally incon-
sistent with the approach outlined by Justice Ginsburg in her dissent.
It would simply require a slightly more robust factual record than Jus-
tice Breyer thought was present in McIntyre.
Accordingly, lower courts are wrong to read Justice Breyer's
opinion as supporting the notion that a manufacturer who targets the
U.S. market as a whole does not also target the individual states that
comprise the U.S. market.1 46 If one accepts Justice Breyer's antisepti-
cally passive depiction of the factual record in McIntyre, it is hard to
say that J. McIntyre was even "targeting" the general U.S. market.
147
In any event, as explained above, Justice Breyer's opinion is entirely
consistent with allowing jurisdiction over defendants who seek to
serve the U.S. market as a whole, provided the record suggests that
145. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 709 (noting the plaintiff's "burden of proof"
with respect to personal jurisdiction); But see John Vail, Six Questions in Light of J. McIntyre,
Ltd. v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV. 517 (2012) (arguing that the defendant should bear the burden
of proving that a state court's assertion of jurisdiction is unconstitutional).
146. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 129-133 and accompanying text.
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potential customers for the defendant's product exist in the forum
state.
V. CONCLUSION
The story of what McIntyre will mean for jurisdictional doctrine is
only beginning to be written. Perhaps the Supreme Court itself will
author a sequel in the not-too-distant future. Although it is possible
that the lack of a majority opinion in McIntyre will prompt another
twenty-year hibernation, the two concurring Justices-Breyer and Al-
ito-indicate that they are open to "a change in present law" if
presented with a case that provides "a better understanding of the
relevant contemporary commercial circumstances," especially "a case
(unlike [McIntyre]) in which the Solicitor General participates. 148
But until that next case reaches One First Street, lower courts must
take care to avoid mistaking McIntyre for something it is not.
148. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2794 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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